Macroevolution and Rationality: Why Non-Belief in Macroevolution Can Be Rational
How to handle the topic of macroevolution is one of the more constant, important and, sometimes, fraught questions affecting Christians in the academy. I will not here consider the typical questions of whether macroevolutionary theory is true, whether it is compatible with plausible and orthodox readings of the Bible, and so on. Instead, I will focus on an assumption held by many in academia: that macroevolution is something in which more or less all rational and informed people will believe, or, more bluntly, the assumption that acceptance of macroevolution is a criterion for rationality. This assumption, I will argue, is highly questionable.
We must distinguish between a historical claim that the macroevolutionary story is true—that life as we know it evolved from common ancestry—and the naturalistic claim that this history can be explained by natural means alone. There are some vulnerabilities in the evidence for the historical claim, and the naturalistic claim is demonstrably false. But what is really interesting, and what is the original—or at least the underappreciated—insight of my article, is this: We cannot assess the probability of the two claims independently. The best case for the historical claim would be a cumulative one which would include the evidence for the naturalistic claim. The falsity of the naturalistic claim means that the historical claim is less likely to be true than it would be otherwise. In particular, a Christian committed to the authority of the Bible need only consider which of two things is higher: the probability that the relevant chapters of the Bible have a historical meaning and the probability, given the available scientific evidence, of the historical macroevolutionary claim. If he finds the former higher than the latter, he may reject macroevolution with full rationality.
I will first briefly review the fact that Christians can believe in macroevolution. Then I will turn to the question whether rationality demands that they should. I will first consider the implicit use of macroevolution as a criterion for rationality, recommending that we examine whether—rather than simply assume that—rational and informed folk will believe in macroevolution. Then I will argue that they need not by distinguishing the historical and the naturalistic claims; reviewing some vulnerabilities in the evidence for the historical claim; explaining why the historical claim is worse off without the naturalistic claim; reviewing some reasons the naturalistic claim is false; and, finally, considering why the historical claim may rationally be rejected and why this is particularly so for Christians. I will close with some reflections on what Christians might do with this information.
I. Christians Can Believe in Macroevolution
Like many other Christians in academia, I have often heard concerns about Christianity and macroevolution. They are not always clearly defined, but the general idea seems to be that Christianity and macroevolution are in some sort of tension such that it is impossible, or at least rather difficult, to accept both. Behind these concerns is an implicit argument along these lines: A Christian cannot believe in macroevolution, but rational and informed people do, and therefore Christianity is not both rational and informed. If both premises are true, these would be serious grounds for concern—a solid argument for a conflict between Christian belief and biological science. However, both premises are false. Here I will briefly address the falsity of the first premise; later I will argue for the falsity of the second premise.
An old insight, but sufficient for undermining this argument, is simple: It is not true that a Christian cannot believe in macroevolution. I have known many who do. Some readers of this article probably do. Some theologians and philosophers do, perhaps including C. S. Lewis and N. T. Wright (though I cannot vouch for that myself). Apologists like William Lane Craig and Andrew Loke argue for the compatibility of Christianity and macroevolution.[1] They are not heretics for doing so.
There is an important distinction between theological error and heresy; theistic macroevolution, the view that God used macroevolution to create life as we know it, is not the latter. Very roughly, a heresy is an impermissible error. Permissible errors include things like the (at least) four inaccurate views in eschatology between amillennialism, historical premillennialism, and Dispensational premillennialism professing a pre-tribulation, mid-tribulation, or post-tribulation rapture. A heresy is an error rendering one who (ir)responsibly holds it not even a Christian; these are the sort of errors, like tri-theism or unitarianism or Arianism, which the Nicene Creed excludes. Theistic macroevolution is not such.
All the same, I would caution orthodox Christians who accept macroevolution to be careful. Some non-heretical views are still errors, some errors are worse than others, and there are even dangerous ways of holding to some correct views. I have four pieces of advice. First, it is better to be a theistic macroevolutionist who recognizes the authority of scripture and rejects a historical view of the opening chapters of Genesis than one who accepts a historical reading of Genesis but thinks the Bible teaches errors. Second, Adam should not be tossed out of our theology lightly (or indeed at all.) The genealogy in Luke 3 has Adam alongside historical characters like Joseph the husband of Mary, Zerubabbel, David, and Abraham; Paul talks about Adam in Romans 5 after talking about Abraham in Romans 4; there is no hint of a switch between historical persons and mere literary devices. Third, it’s risky for a Christian to carve out a deistic region in her theology. It is better to think of creation as filled with the glory of God, as Psalm 8 proclaims, and that including design. God did not set up creation, let it go for a few million years, and then jump back in in the last few thousand. It’s better to be a theistic macroevolutionist than simply a macroevolutionist who happens to be a theist. Fourth, don’t make God the reason we have death and suffering in this world. Eons of natural selection coming before any human had a free choice would need to be explained. Perhaps angelic sin was involved, or perhaps human sin can have some effect backwards in time, and in any case animal suffering does not matter as much as human suffering. The point is not that this cannot be explained, but only that it would need to be.
Other pious guidance is available in such matters from Christian philosophers.[2]
II. The Questionable Idea of Belief in Macroevolution as a Criterion for Rationality
An alternative approach to undermining the argument mentioned above is new, or at any rate rarely examined in academic settings: It is false that rational and informed people must believe in macroevolution. We must first consider what exactly this notion means. The point seems to be that all, or very nearly all, rational and informed people these days do believe it. The idea is apparently that belief in macroevolution is able to function as a criterion for rationality—at least among reasonably informed and well-educated people these days. This assumption seems very widespread. Alvin Plantinga cites some scholars making it, and observes that macroevolution “is an idol of the contemporary tribe; it serves as a shibboleth, a litmus test distinguishing the ignorant and bigoted fundamentalist goats from the properly acculturated and scientifically receptive sheep.”[3] David Gelernter similarly observes that Darwinian evolution
is basic to the credo that defines the modern worldview. Accepting the theory as settled truth—no more subject to debate than the earth being round or the sky blue or force being mass times acceleration—certifies that you are devoutly orthodox in your scientific views; which in turn is an essential first step towards being taken seriously in any part of modern intellectual life.[4]
But the assumption in action is easier to see than scholarly references to it. Picture armies of students who asked some Christian teacher or pastor some form of the “But what about evolution?” question while under its influence. Consider that I have a PhD and an academic job, as a result of which many simply assume that I accept macroevolution; the idea that I might not is not simply deemed improbable; rather, it is practically unthinkable from the start.
But why assume that belief in macroevolution is a criterion for rationality? Perhaps some few, rather than simply assuming it, have argued for it by arguing that the evidence for macroevolution is so good that no one informed and rational can fail to accept it. I have my doubts about this strategy. I find the evidence for any number of things I believe in philosophy, religion, economics, and more to be extremely good such that I do not understand how anyone both informed of the evidence and rational can fail to accept them. But many still do fail to accept them. What am I to make of this—that they are irrational, that they are not properly informed, or that I am the one who is wrong about something? If I am wrong, am I wrong about my belief, about the quality of the evidence, or about how rational people who understand the evidence will surely accept it? It might be any of these, perhaps singly or in combination. We should be careful about arguing that someone informed and rational must accept some particular view. We who are arguing this are fallible ourselves, and there is always the problem that the evidence for a particular fact may be subtle or multifaceted, and as a result partially elusive even to rational and informed people. In any case, some who are well informed and mostly rational may still have some region of irrationality in their minds—or, putting it more nicely, blind spots. Everyone has some. That’s life.
I suspect, however, that most who treat acceptance of macroevolution as a criterion for rationality really are just assuming it, rarely taking much time to examine their assumption. For them, William James’ comments on the psychology of academics are apropos:
Here in this room, we all of us believe in molecules and the conservation of energy, in democracy and necessary progress, in Protestant Christianity and the duty of fighting for “the doctrine of the immortal Monroe,” all for no reasons worthy of the name. We see into these matters with no more inner clearness, and probably with much less, than any disbeliever in them might possess. His unconventionality would probably have some grounds to show for its conclusions; but for us, not insight, but the prestige of the opinions, is what makes the spark shoot from them and light up our sleeping magazines of faith. Our reason is quite satisfied . . . if it can find a few arguments that will do to recite in case our credulity is criticised by some one else. Our faith is faith in some one else’s faith . . . .[5]
James’ examples of academically prestigious views fit late 1800s northeastern American universities. We still believe in molecules and the conservation of energy, but an updated list would have to include some form of the word “Darwinism” in place of Protestantism and the Monroe Doctrine, perhaps with other changes. This is how many in academia believe in the Monroe Doctrine then, macroevolution now, and molecules in both times. Those who treat macroevolution as a criterion for rationality are not greatly influenced by their mastery of the evidence, still less by a knowledge of epistemology sufficient rightly to determine a criterion for rationality. What has really convinced them that rational and informed folks these days must accept macroevolution is its prestige.
So I am against assuming that acceptance of macroevolution is any kind of criterion for rationality. I will now argue that it is a poor criterion.
III. Non-Belief in Macroevolution Can Be Rational
We must begin with a distinction between two claims:
1. The historical claim: Macroevolution happened; the species on earth today evolved from a common ancestor.[6]
2. The naturalistic claim: Natural processes are sufficient to explain life on earth as it exists today.
Two reasons weigh against macroevolution as a criterion for rationality. First, there are some vulnerabilities in the evidence for the historical claim. Second, the naturalistic claim may reasonably be rejected: Unlike the historical claim, the naturalistic claim is not treated as a criterion for rationality and, in any case, it is false. This weakens to some extent the cumulative case for the historical claim, which puts the Christian specifically in an interesting position: She need only decide whether the historical claim, its evidence thus weakened, is more likely than a straightforward reading of the Bible as teaching something incompatible with macroevolution.
A. Vulnerabilities in the Historical Claim
We begin with a brief look at two vulnerabilities in the evidence for the historical claim. (This will not be a detailed survey, and the reader should keep in mind that, while I have some skills as a logician and an epistemologist, I am only presenting my working views on topics largey dealing with matters where I have no expertise.)
First, macroevolutionary theory has some failed predictions in its record. Now I would not consign a theory to the dustbin of history, nor accuse it of being non-scientific, merely because it kept going after some data inconsistent with one of its predictions turned up. Thomas Kuhn does not believe in falsification in the sense in which Karl Popper does, and I am inclined to agree.[7] Even when black swans were discovered a scientist could stick with his theory that all swans are white and categorize these strange black birds as a different species. (Not the best move—Kuhn agrees that finding data in tension with a theory can justify a shift to a new theory.) I will not say that macroevolution fails just because it has some failed predictions; nor will I attempt to say how many failed predictions, and of what sort, should disqualify a theory. I just think, without having worked out the details, that it counts for something against a theory when its predictions fail. This has happened with macroevolutionary theory at least thrice.
Macroevolutionary theory predicts a host of vestigial organs left over from our evolutionary past which once helped an organism survive and propagate, but which in present circumstances do not serve this purpose. This prediction has failed.[8] (Even the human appendix has a function.)
Macroevolutionary theory also predicts a good bit of junk DNA. The whole topic of junk DNA is complicated, turning up in multiple places and doing different things. It can be used as a sort of genetic problem of evil argument against God—“Surely your divine designer would not have done such a lousy job with our DNA!” Alternatively, junk DNA might be considered as a genetic corollary to vestigial organs—DNA leftover from our evolutionary past, once used as coding for some function useful to an organism’s survival and propagation but useful no longer. Or, finally, junk DNA can be predicted as a side-effect of the mutation-selection mechanism of neo-Darwinian macroevolution: Mutations produce new strands of DNA which never do anything useful but are not particularly harmful and slip through the filters of natural selection. It is one or both of these two latter senses of junk DNA which macroevolutionary theory predicts. But there is little to no junk DNA.[9]
Another failed prediction is that the fossil record would show gradual change. This, however, is a failed prediction of classical Darwinism, not of all forms of Darwinism. In particular, it does not count against the theory of punctuated equilibrium, the idea that evolution is very gradual most of the time but pretty fast at other times.
We may more quickly look at a second weakness, or at least a certain lack of strength, in the evidence for macroeovolution: The power of the evidence from overlapping DNA, or other genetic or biochemical similarities between different species, has sometimes been oversold. Of course, macroevolutionary theory predicts such overlap or similarity, so when we find some we are finding relevant evidence consistent with a theory. That counts for something. But it is not good evidence for adopting the theory in the first place, for it is perfectly consistent, arguably a prediction, of at least one other theory. A good coder may reuse good code, and we would be a little surprised if he never did. If God designed shrimp, guinea pigs, baboons, and humans to live on the same planet where plants use carbon dioxide and produce oxygen, he would likely design them in similar ways. It is unsurprising, from any version of a theistic worldview, that they would all use oxygen and produce carbon dioxide and have some overlap in their DNA.[10]
Some argue for other vulnerabilities or weaknesses. There are alleged to be major failures in the fossil record to establish macroevolution at all, much less the detailed pictures given in science textbooks.[11] Particularly important is the appearance of new animal forms emerging very rapidly with little to no information on their evolutionary backstory.[12] But an evaluation of this, or other alleged failures of the macroevolutionary evidence, would take us still further from my own areas of competence, might take us too far afield, and would definitely take too long. The point is not a thorough reckoning with the evidence, but only to see how there are at least some vulnerabilities in the evidence that macroevolution happened.
B. If the Naturalistic Claim Is False, the Historical Claim Is Worse Off as a Result
What of the second claim—that there is a sufficient naturalistic explanation for it happening? This claim may rationally be rejected, but before we examine its manifest falsity we must consider its cultural status, particularly in academia, and consider how its falsity would weaken the case for the historical claim.
In academia, it seems that the claim one must accept in order to be in the good graces of one’s colleagues is not the naturalistic claim but the historical one. Only the latter is treated as a criterion for rationality. You are allowed to believe that God created the universe, that God got life started off, and even that God nudged the evolutionary process towards the ultimate rise of his chosen hominids. You might be a little weird, but you pass basic muster if you at least acknowledge the historical claim that life as we know it evolved from common stock. One can reject the naturalistic claim and still be considered rational. It seems that any number of religiously minded philosophers, theologians, or scientists have taken up the academy on this generous offer.[13]
Very well—I agree that one may rationally reject the naturalistic claim. But that leaves the evidence for the historical claim in a somewhat weaker position. For here is the crucial point about the historical claim that macroevolution led life on earth from a common ancestor to where it is now: That evidence must be cumulative. We cannot base the historical claim on the fossil record alone, nor on overlapping DNA alone, nor on the elegance of the neo-Darwinian chance-plus-natural-selection theory, nor on the ability of evolutionary change involving natural selection to explain how the fauna of Australia or the Galapagos Islands are similar to each other and different from their African or Asian counterpars. Multiple lines of evidence must come together to make macroevolution the best account.
One important part of this cumulative case is the naturalistic claim. If we have some good evidence that this macroevolution happened, it will be somewhat less good without the accompanying claim that the natural processes involved are a sufficient explanation for it happening. The evidence for the historical claim should ideally be a cumulative case consisting of different forms of direct evidence for that claim, bolstered by the evidence for the naturalistic claim. Without that bolstering, how good is the remaining evidence? I am myself unsure how good, but I am sure it is less good. Without the naturalistic claim, we are left with an incomplete set of puzzle pieces, a theory that the completed puzzle would depict certain natural processes making life as we know it happen, and no independent reason to think that they even can. How strong is that evidence?
The answer might depend on just how many are the weaknesses of the naturalistic claim, and on just what they are. If naturalistic explanations can explain everything but the beginning of the first living cell, then the historical claim might still get some serious bolstering from what what’s left of the naturalistic claim. If they also fail to explain human consciousness and the emergence of birds from dinosaurs, there will be that much less bolstering. Accordingly, we will shortly look at some of the specific reasons the naturalistic claim is false.
But first we had better clarify what we have just learned: We have not learned that the historical claim is either false or irrational, and we have not even, strictly speaking, proven that rejecting it can be rational. We have proven that, insofar as it is rational to reject the naturalistic claim, it is at least somewhat less irrational to reject the historical—or, at any rate, to not accept it. And we have uncovered grounds for suspicion that there is anything irrational at all about it.
C. Why the Naturalistic Claim Is False
So why is the naturalistic claim false? There are (at least) the following, partially overlapping reasons (two of which are actually in my area of expertise).
First of all, how life allegedly began in the first place by purely natural means remains a mystery.
Second, there are, at least potentially, some serious problems for the naturalistic claim involved with certain teleological arguments—arguments from evidence of design in nature. I am thinking in particular of arguments involving irreducible complexity and the information in DNA.[14]
Third, perhaps the strongest rebuttal of the naturalistic claim: There is no materialistic explanation of consciousness. This, of course, is an immense topic, one I hope to introduce in more detail in my next book.[15] (I once heard a philosopher question the existence of consciousness on the grounds that it is difficult to explain it in evolutionary terms. Plainly, there is a presumption here that we should question whatever cannot be explained in evolutionary terms. Since I know for certain that I am conscious, I would sooner reject this presumption than question the existence of consciousness.)
Fourth, a weaker reason: Gradualism, the view that gradual change is responsible for life as we know it today, has failed. Gradualism is a natural corollary to naturalistic explanations, for such explanations normally seek to explain how complex things are explicable in terms of simpler things; big changes (like from prokaryote to alligator) can be understood in terms of many small changes. The failure of gradualism is most clear in irreducible complexity. Gradualism has also failed to turn up in the fossil record, and thus many have abandoned classical Darwinism for punctuated equilibrium. This is a coherent theory, and the failure of gradualism in the fossil record is suggestive but is not decisive evidence against naturalistic explanation—perhaps if we have enough thousands of years it is still gradual enough, and it is not a matter of necessity that all naturalistic changes are gradual ones.
I conclude that the naturalistic claim is false, and that the direct evidence for the historical claim will have to shift for itself.
D. The Rationality of Rejecting the Historical Claim, Especially for Christians
The case for the historical claim ought to be cumulative, consisting of two categories of evidence: the direct evidence for the historical claim, and the evidence for the naturalistic claim. There are some vulnerabilities in the first of these categories, and the second category of evidence fails to lend support, for the naturalistic claim is false for multiple reasons. All things considered, it is likely that the evidence for the historical claim is sufficiently weak that it is after all possible rationally to reject (or at least rationally not to accept) it.
But suppose a person assesses the strength of that evidence as still pretty good—at, say, 70% odds. This brings us to a final reason the historical claim can be rationally rejected—a reason applying to the Christian specifically. The Christian (as Plantinga is fond of pointing out) has particular responsibilities to his own faith tradition—to Christ, Gospel, scripture, and church. The Nicene Creed does not forbid belief in macroevolution, but a straightforward, historical reading of Genesis 1-2 does. If such a reading is correct, then the Christian, recognizing the authority of scripture, ought to conclude that the historical as well as the naturalistic claim is false.
But how likely is it that such a reading is correct?
Now we could make things complicated here, tracing all the evidence available for the existence of God, the truth of the Gospel, and the authority of the scriptures[16]—and then multiply the resulting probability for the authority of the Bible by the probability that these particular chapters have a straightforward sense. We could then compare that to the probability for the historical macroevolutionary claim by itself (without the naturalistic evolutionary claim) and see which is bigger. A Christian whose sense of the resulting probability of one is stronger than her sense of the resulting probability of the other may rationally reject the other.
But this is too complicated, and anyway I am none too sure what numbers to use. So let’s look at a simpler comparison. The Christian should accept the authority of the scriptures—whatever may be the probability of the evidence, it calls for a commitment to Christ with all that involves, up to and including trust in the Scriptures recognized by the faith he endorsed and established.[17] That means she may reasonably consider a simplified question of just two probabilities: the probability of the evidence for the historical macroevolutionary claim given the available scientific evidence for it (apart from the naturalistic claim) and the probability that these chapters of Genesis have a historical meaning. Perhaps neither is especially high—maybe both are hovering around 50%. Or perhaps both are pretty good. But even if the evidence for the historical macroevolutionary claim is pretty good, say somewhere around 70%, she may rationally reject macroevolution if her sense of the Scriptures leads her to place the likelihood of Genesis 1-2 having a historical meaning to be better still—perhaps at 75%. Or, if the former is at 75% and the latter at 70%, then she should reject a historical meaning of Genesis 1-2. This sort of thing is often recognized by sober Christian thinkers: Science can disambiguate scripture. This reasoning works because the Bible is the Word of God and because there are different available assessments of probability both for an interpretation of a passage in the Bible and for scientific claims. And that shows that a Christian may also rationally reject macroevolution when she rationally thinks that the evidence for it renders it less likely than a straightforward historical reading of Genesis 1-2.
But just how high is either of these probabilities? Of course, the majority view in academia assesses the probability of the historical macroevolutionary claim as being rather high. I have my doubts, and I have already considered some reasons it may not be especially high. I have nothing to say at present about the probability of a historical reading of Genesis 1-2, but I can clarify one thing: While I welcome theological readings of Genesis 1-2, and have no particular objection to symbolic or figurative or moral readings, they count for little or nothing against a historical reading. It is fashionable to appeal to the church’s long history of non-literal, non-historical, or otherwise non-straightforward readings of Genesis 1-2 and other Bible passages. Fair enough. But these readings are likely to accompany literal, historical, or otherwise straightforward readings. Augustine famously allegorizes the first few sentences of Genesis in Book XIII of the Confessions, but he explains in Book XII that the Bible can have multiple layers of meaning, and he affirms a six-day creation in The City of God (Civ. 12.10-12.12). Perhaps Genesis 1-2 are theology, poetry, literature, psychology, philosophy, or something else, and I daresay they are not the same kind of history as scholars write today; but that does not mean they are not history. Some argue that historical readings from church fathers or other great theologians strongly or exclusively favor the literal and historical.[18] This is a case to be considered carefully with attention to original sources; I cannot myself vouch for more than I have already said about Augustine.
This points to another interesting consideration: Trust is important, necessary, and (frequently) reasonable, an insight explained by the likes of Augustine and contemporary Christian philosopher Linda Zagzebski.[19] But may not the Christian trust those scholars who assess the evidence for the historical claim as rather high? May he not likewise trust those theologians who argue that the relevant Bible passages do not have a historical meaning? This would affect one’s assessment of the probabilities in favor of belief in macroevolution. And what about trusting Augustine and certain other theologians or pastors, trusting whom would affect our assessment in the opposite direction? Or what about William James’ remarks on the reasons for the academic dominance of one view over another, or other considerations which might possibly undermine trust in a current majority academic view? I have largely focused here on how a person thinks through this for himself, but no one can think through everything at once; some level of trust is necessary for all of us, and higher levels of trust are necessary for some. Whom one trusts on these matters, and what he knows and understands of what his trustees say, will affect his assessment of the probabilities. So our analysis here is still somewhat provisional, for it lacks a detailed look at what the relevant scholars and theologians say and why they say it, at whom we should trust on these questions and to what extent, and at what to do in the event that trusted sources disagree.
I am only interested in the rationality of rejecting (or at least not accepting) the historical macroevolutionary claim, particularly for a Christian who accepts the authority of Scripture. I am not arguing which view is correct.[20] The upshot of it all is: Although it is possible to be a Christian and accept macroevolution, acceptance of macroevolution is no requirement for rationality (even among the well-informed in this day and age). There are important vulnerabilities in the direct evidence for the theory that it happened at all. The theory that natural explanations are available for it happening is a failure, and in any case those who treat acceptance that macroevolution happened as a criterion for rationality tend not to treat as a criterion for rationality acceptance that there are natural explanations for it. But if we can rationally reject the sufficiency of natural explanations for macroevolution, then we can rationally conclude that the cumulative evidence that it happened at all is, to some degree, weaker. In particular, a Christian who rationally assesses the evidence that it happened as less likely than the evidence for a historical reading of the opening chapters of Genesis may reject macroevolution with full rationality.
IV. What Should Christians Scholars and Teachers Do with This Information?
There may be various things Christians might do with this information as we go about trying to integrate Christian belief with academic excellence. I will suggest two.
First, perhaps some of us could do with a little more charity for one another. Those who disbelieve in macroevolution would do well to keep in mind that the believers are not therefore heretics, and in many cases no doubt mean about as well as the disbelievers. They just have a different assessment of the probabilities of macroevolution given the scientific evidence for it, of the probability of a historical meaning for the early chapters of Genesis, or both. Meanwhile, the believers in macroevolution would do well to keep in mind that the disbelievers are not irrational, and in many cases are probably roughly as informed and rational as oneself. They just have a different assessment of one or both of the same probabilities.
Second, we might heed some words from Plantinga. Describing Christian sellouts to Logical Positivism—an errant philosophy of yesteryear—Plantinga says: “Christian philosophers should have displayed more integrity, more independence, less readiness to trim their sails to the prevailing philosophical winds of doctrine, and more Christian self-confidence.”[21] This is good advice for all Christian scholars: We should not surrender to prevailing cultural or academic winds. A Christian should believe in macroevolution if she must. But she should do so on the basis of the relative strength of the evidence for it and the relative weakness of the theological arguments against it if, with all due carefulness of thought and piety of spirit, she thus assesses them. But let us not let our sense of the evidence be swayed by mere scholarly prestige or uncritically examined assumptions about what is rational.
[1] William Lane Craig, In Quest of the Historical Adam: A Biblical and Scientific Exploration (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2021); William Lane Craig, “#441: Must a Darwinian Be a Non-Christian?;” Reasonable Faith (September 27, 2015), https://www.reasonablefaith.org/question-answer/P70/must-a-darwinian-be-a-non-christian; Andrew Ter Ern Loke, The Origin of Humanity and Evolution: Science and Scripture in Conversation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2023). For an introduction to the contemporary discussion of some related matters, see Kenneth D. Keathley, ed., Perspectives on the Historical Adam and Eve: Four Views (Nashville, TN: B&H Academic, 2024).
[2] Including Craig, In Quest of the Historical Adam; Craig, “#441; Loke, The Origin of Humanity and Evolution; and Alvin Plantinga in Calvin University, “Christian, Evolutionist, or Both?”; YouTube Interview with Alvin Plantinga; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f2yLIbe9jyc.
[3] Alvin Plantinga, “When Faith and Reason Clash: Evolution and the Bible,” 9, https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/43150/plantinga.pdf. The document is an online reprint from Christian Scholars Review 21.1 (1991): 8-33).
[4] David Gelernter, “Giving Up Darwin: A Fond Farewell to a Brilliant and Beautiful Theory,” Claremont Review of Books 8.1 (Spring 2019), https://claremontreviewofbooks.com/giving-up-darwin/.
[5] William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897; reprint, New York: Dover, 1956), 9.
[6] This claim can be broken down into smaller claims. A more detailed set of distinctions is used by Plantinga, “When Faith and Reason Clash.”
[7] Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 145.
[8] For an introduction, see Casey Luskin, “The Top Ten Scientific Problems with Biological and Chemical Evolution;” Discovery Institute (February 20, 2015), Problem 10, https://www.discovery.org/a/24041/.
[9] For a simple online introduction pointing to more readings, see Stephen C. Meyer, “Sauce for the Goose: Intelligent Design, Scientific Methodology, and the Demarcation Problem” Discovery Institute (February 15, 2011), Section 3.5, https://www.discovery.org/a/20173/. Also see Jonathan Wells, The Myth of Junk DNA (Seattle, WA: Discovery Institute Press, 2011).
[10] “As for the similarity in biochemistry of all life, this is reasonably probable on the hypothesis of special creation, hence not much by way of evidence against it, hence not much by way of evidence for evolution;” Plantinga, “When Faith and Reason Clash,” 14.
[11] For example, Plantinga, “When Faith and Reason Clash,” 14-15, and Luskin, “The Top Ten Scientific Problems,” Problem 5.
[12] A key topic in the doubts described in, for example, Gelernter, “Giving Up Darwin,” and Stephen C. Meyer, Darwin's Doubt: The Explosive Origin of Animal Life and the Case for Intelligent Design (San Francisco: HarperOne, 2013).
[13] Just to give a few examples of those who apparently accept some or all of macroevolutionary theory but reject a purely natural explanation: Plantinga, “When Faith and Reason Clash”; Alvin Plantinga in Calvin University, “Christian, Evolutionist, or Both?”; Clayton and Kries, Two Wings, 195; and William Lane Craig, “What is the Relation between Science and Religion,” Reasonable Faith, https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/popular-writings/science-theology/what-is-the-relation-between-science-and-religion.
[14] The interested reader might consider sources on such arguments like William Dembski, Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science and Theology (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1999); William Dembski and Winston Ewert, The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance through Small Probabilities, 2nd ed. (Seattle: Discovery Institute Press, 2023); Stephen C. Meyer, Signature in the Cell: DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design (Francisco: HarperOne, 2009); Michael J. Behe, Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
[15] Mark J. Boone, Integrating Christian Faith and Reason (forthcoming), chapter 7. Here I will also introduce the hylomorphist alternative to materialism, which suggests the possibility of an alternative conclusion: Could a non-materialistic evolutionary naturalism explain consciousness? In other words, might evolutionary processes be neither purely matter-based nor aided by a supernatural, and thus have a chance of explaining consciousness in non-materialistic terms? Although I am not aware of who, if anyone, might promote such a view, it is at least a plausible route for avoiding the inference from “There is no materialistic explanation for consciousness” to “It is not the case that natural processes are sufficient to explain life as it exists today.” I leave it to others more interested in such an account to develop it further.
[16] I will analyze the structure of this evidence in Boone, Integrating Christian Faith and Reason, chapters 5-6.
[17] A topic I consider more thoroughly in Boone, Integrating Christian Faith and Reason, chapters 6 and 8.
[18] For example, Jonathan Sarfati, Refuting Compromise: A Biblical and Scientific Refutation of “Progressive Creationism” (Billions of Years), As Popularized by Astronomer Hugh Ross (Green Forest, AR: Master Books, 2004), 107-139.
[19] Augustine, Confessions, Book VI; De Utilitate Credendi (On the Usefulness of Believing); and De Fide Rerum Quae Non Videntur (On Faith in Things Which Are Not Seen). Also Linda Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
[20] These considerations about macroevolution do not apply directly to the age of the earth. But the consideration of what Christians ought to think applies: a Christian might rationally believe in a young earth if, and only if, she rationally assesses the probability that Genesis 1-2 rule out an old earth as higher than the probability for an old earth given the scientific evidence for it.
[21] Alvin Plantinga, “Advice to Christian Philosophers,” Faith and Philosophy 1.3 (1984): 258.
MARK J. BOONE
Assistant Headmaster | Founders Classical Academy